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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEO I. TANNEHILL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LEWIS N. TERRY, ) 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No. 
9154 
The appellant in his brief has made a statement of facts 
which is considered to be sufficient, generally speaking, for 
the purpose of this appeal. However, we have marshalled 
additional pertinent facts which we respectfully invite the 
court's attention to and desire that they be considered as a 
supplement to the appellant's statement. 
Plaintiff had watched the defendant hit one practice ball 
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(Tr. 7). He was also familiar with the fact that when a person 
strikes a golf ball with a golf club that there is a backswing 
and follow-through (Tr. 17 & 18). When plaintiff stepped 
forward to hit a ball he was immediately told by defendant 
that he was not holding the club properly and was told to stand 
aside and watch the defendant show him how to swing (Tr. 
21) . Defendant told plaintiff to observe the angle of the club 
as it came down in his hands and the angle of his body (Tr. 
21) . He stood off to the side of the defendant and watched 
the defendant raise the club and observed defendant's back-
swing, immediately prior to being struck (Tr. 23). Plaintiff 
did nothing when he saw the defendant begin to swing the 
club and in fact admitted watching the defendant's action 
but did not move from the time he noticed defendant addressing 
the ball until he was struck by the club (Tr. 23 & 39). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE 
QUESTION OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK TO THE JURY. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC-
TION ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS APPLIED TO THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE, AND SUCH INSTRUCTION WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE 
QUESTION OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK TO THE JURY. 
On page four of plaintiffs brief, he admits receiving a 
warning from the defendant and subsequent to this warning, 
the defendant addressed the ball for some time before swing-
ing the club. Plaintiff further admits that he is familiar with 
the way a golf club is swung and that he himself has done so 
(Tr. 17). Plaintiff stood back and watched the defendant 
address the ball and then swing the club without taking any 
precautions for his own safety (Tr. 23 and 39). It is submitted 
that the plaintiff, by standing near the defendant and at all 
times watching him, could not help but have full knowledge 
that the defendant was going to swing the club. He also 
testified to knowing the way a golf club is swung from watching 
others, and admitted that on this very day and immediately 
prior to the accident, he had observed the defendant swing 
the club. Plaintiff could not help but have been aware of the 
simple fact that if he stood too close to the defendant while 
the defendant was swinging the golf club, that he very likely 
would be struck by the club. This is purely a case of voluntary 
exposure to obvious danger, which was and should have been 
perfectly apparent to the plaintiff. We accordingly cannot 
agree with plaintiff's statement on page five of his brief wherein 
he says: 
"We submit that the only real defense of assumption 
of risk is the first type, that the second type is, and can 
only be, contributory negligence." 
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This court, in the case of Clay vs. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 
239 Pac. 2d 1075, has said otherwise: 
"The essential elements of assumed risk are knowl-
edge, actual or implied, by the plaintiff of a specific 
defect or dangerous condition caused by the negligence 
of the defendant in violaton of some duty owing to the 
plamtiff, ... " (Italics ours). 
Thus, we respectfully submit, that this court has clearly 
held that there may be an assumption of risk although the 
defendant does owe a duty to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff further argues on page five of his brief: 
"In order for there to be contributory negligence 
there must not only be an intentional exposure to danger 
created by defendant's negligence, but, also, that ex-
posure must be unreasonable." 
This is not a correct statement of the law and such reasoning 
is obviously fallacious. It would eliminate the defense of con-
tributory negligence where the plaintiff negligently exposed 
himself to danger without any intent. The authorities opposing 
plaintiff's reasoning are too numerous to mention. 
A careful review of Clay vs. Dunford, Supra, will reveal 
facts clearly distinguishing that case from the present case 
concerning the application of the doctrine of assumption of 
risk. In the Clay case, the plaintiff not only did not see 'the 
defendant's vehicle but was walking with his back toward 
the vehicle. He was also not in a position on the roadway that 
would normally have been dangerous. In the present case, 
plaintiff admittedly looked and saw the defendant in a position 
preparing to swing and then watched him swing the golf club 
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(Tr. 23, 38, & 39). The peril was obvious to anyone who 
looked and saw, as did the plaintiff. Plaintiff also admitted 
that he watched the defendant swing at one ball and had 
watched other golfers swing at golf balls as well as having 
done so himself on occasion (Tr. 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 38 and 
39). Therefore, unlike the Clay case, our instant plaintiff did 
look, and did see, and accordingly the peril was obvious. The 
same distinguishing features are present in the instant case when 
compared with the case of Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 
268, 342 Pac. 2d 884, cited in plaintiff's brief. In the Johnson 
case, the plaintiff admittedly did not see the oncoming emer-
gency vehicle and therefore could not be charged with assuming 
a risk when she was completely unaware of its presence. 
The plaintiff has cited the case of Brady vs. Kane, 111 
Southern 2d 472, as "a case very similar to the one at bar 
... " A review of the facts in the Brady case will readily 
disclose the lack of similarity. In that case, the plaintiff was 
one of a golf foursome. The players were on the tee, after 
having played several holes, and the plaintiff was standing 
behind the person preparing to drive the ball. Testimony was 
to the effect that the plaintiff was to be the second man to drive. 
While the first driver was addressing the ball the defendant, 
standing behind the other members of the foursome, and 
without warning, made a practice swing, striking the plaintiff 
in the head. The facts clearly show that plaintiff was watching 
the person preparing to drive and was looking down the fair-
way. He had his back turned to the defendant when the injury 
occurred. We respectfully submit that there is no similarity 
of facts whatsoever inasmuch as the plaintiff in the instant 
case has admitted observing the movements of the defendant 
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before he swung the club. He was also warned by the defendant 
to stand back and observe his movements, while he prepared 
to further demonstrate how to properly swing a golf club. In 
the Brady case, the court further said: 
"A member of a golfing foursome assumes certain 
obvious and ordinary risks of the sport by participating 
therein with knowledge of its normal dangers ... " 
This clearly demonstrates that anyone familiar with the sport 
must realize that you canot stand within club's distance of the 
person about to swing without assuming the risk of being 
struck by the club. Such is true of other sports, including base-
ball, tennis, or hockey, etc. 
In our instant case, the plaintiff, after having been warned 
to step back, apparently chose a position so close to the de-
fendant that he must have known there was a very great 
probability that he would be struck with the club when the 
defendant proceeded with his demonstration. 
We see little point in belaboring this court with a lengthy 
discussion concerning plaintiff's argument in his brief wherein 
he apparently denies that there can be an assumption of risk 
doctrine applied where the defendant is negligent, for the 
reason that plaintiff's own authorities do not support him 
in that respect. In the cited case of Rogers vs. Los Angeles 
Transit Lines, 45 Cal. 2d 414, 289 Pac. 2d 226, the court said: 
"While a person, if fully informed, may assume the 
risk even though the dangerous condition is caused 
by the negligence of others." (Italics ours). 
The court then cited Prescott vs. Ralph's Grocery Company, 
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42 Cal. 2d 158, 265 Pac. 2d 904, and quoting from that case 
stated: 
"The plaintiff does not assume the risk of any negli-
gence which he has no reason to anticipate, but once 
he is fully informed of it, it is well settled that the 
risks arising from such negligence may be assumed." 
See also Prosser on Torts, page 385. 
The case of Garcia vs. San Gabriel Ready Mix Company, 
155 Cal. Appeal2d 568, 318 Pac. 2d 145, cited by the plaintiff, 
is of little help as the facts in that case indicated that the 
plaintiff could understand but very little English and the 
defendant's employee could not understand the plaintiff's 
language and as a result plaintiff obviously did not understand 
the risk or danger involved through his conversations with the 
workman. The Supreme Court of California in the case of 
Prescott vs. Ralph's Grocery Company, supra, further said: 
"As we have seen, the elements of assumption of 
risk are a person's knowledge and appreciation of 
the danger involved and his voluntary acceptance of 
the risk. It follows that a person, if he is fully informed, 
may assume a risk even though the dangerous con-
dition is caused by the negligence of others. Indeed, 
the cases in which this defense is applied, usually in-
volve dangerous conditions created by the negligence 
of another." 
Suffice it to say, this court does recognize the doctrine 
of assumption of risk when applied to appropriate facts where 
defendant's negligence or lack of due care has created a danger-
ous situation which plaintiff could have, but voluntarily and 
deliberately fails to avoid and thereby asumes the risk of 
being injured. 
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We therefore respectfully submit that in our instant case 
the trail court properly submitted assumption of risk to the 
Jury. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC-
TION ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS APPLIED TO THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE, AND SUCH INSTRUCTION WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the court's instruction 
on assumption of risk was a correct statement of the law as 
applied to the factual situation herein and was in no way 
prejudicial to the plaintiff. The undisputed evidence clearly 
shows that the plaintiff saw the defendant about to swing 
the club, as the defendant took some time to address the ball. 
Plaintiff admitted having been told to stand back and observe 
the defendant and his actions. He admits that he did stand 
back and stood observing the defendant address the ball and 
swing the club. He apparently did nothing to remove himself 
from the obvious condition of peril in which he voluntarily 
placed himself. His own testimony clearly shows that he was 
aware of the conditions as they existed, and stood by and 
watched the defendant swing the club which thereafter struck 
him in the head. We respectfully submit that under these 
circumstances, the court's instruction fairly and adequately 
covered the factual situation and there has been no showing 
in plaintiff's brief that such instruction was in any manner 
prejudicial to plaintiff or his cause. 
10 
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As this court recently said in the case of Ferguson vs. 
Jongsma, 350 Pac. 2d 404, decided March 22, 1960, speaking 
through Mr. Justice Wade: 
"If the instruction is based on a factual situation 
which would support a finding of contributory negli-
gence but the instruction erroneously called it assump-
tion of risk, this alone would not be prejudicial error.'' 
In the aforementioned Instruction No. 8, the trial court 
correctly set forth the law as it applied to our instant factual 
situation. The court said in effect that if plaintiff knew of the 
dangerous conduct of the defendant, or that he should have 
known of such from the perfectly obvious conduct of the 
defendant, and that plaintiff with this knowledge voluntarily 
placed himself or remained in the position of danger, then 
plaintiff assumed the risk and if the jury so found, then he 
would not be entitled to recover from the defendant any 
damage caused to him without intention on the part of the 
defendant. 
We are unable to visualize a more appropriate factual 
situation than the one at hand to apply the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk. Certainly plaintiff cannot contend that he didn't 
have knowledge of the dangerous situation as it then existed 
any more than a person sitting as a spectator in the grandstand 
at a baseball game could say that no risk had been assumed 
after being struck by a ball hit by one of the batters in the 
game. The facts unequivocally show that the instant plaintiff 
voluntarily and deliberately failed to avoid the situation and 
certainly thereby assumed the risk of any injury he may have 
sustained when struck by the golf club. The mere fact that 
plaintiff failed to take any action to duck or step aside indicates 
11 
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that he accepted the obvious, and thereby brought himself 
within an area where this doctrine would be applicable. At 
any rate, under both the doctrine of contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk, whether the plaintiff failed to use due 
care for his own safety or he deliberately assumed the risk 
of injury in the face of known danger, was a jury question 
(italics ours). See Ferguson vs. Jongsma, supra. Also, Esernia 
vs. Overland Moving Company, 1949, 115 Utah 519, 205 
Pac. 2d 621. 
Plaintiff undoubtedly contends that he didn't know that 
defendant intended to swing the club and only that he thought 
defendant would merely make a backswing. The evidence fails 
to support this contention, particularly when defendant testi-
fied: "Leo, will you get out of the way. I am going to hit the 
ball" (Tr. 44). Thus it became a jury question as to what 
occurred and the trial court properly submitted the case to 
the jury on both theories of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk insofar as the affirmative defense aspect 
of the case was concerned. We accordingly respectfully submit 
that the court was not in error in its Instruction No. 8 as given 
to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully and earnestly contend that the trial court 
lawfully and properly submitted the defense of asumption of 
risk to the jury and that the instruction to the jury in that respect 
was proper and not prejudicial to the plaintiff. We further 
submit that the verdict in favor of the defendant and against 
12 
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the plaintiff "No Cause of Action" should be affirmed on this 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HURD, BAYLE & HURD 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
Counsel for Defendant and Respondent 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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